Arrow's impossibility theorem [1] shows that the set of acyclic tournaments is not closed to non dictatorial Boolean aggregation. In this paper we extend the notion of aggregation to general tournaments and we show that for tournaments with four vertices or more any proper symmetric (closed to vertex permutations) subset cannot be closed to non dictatorial monotone aggregation and to non neutral aggregation. We also demonstrate a proper subset of tournaments that is closed to parity aggregation for an arbitrarily large number of vertices. This proves a conjecture of Kalai [4] for the non neutral and the non dictatorial and monotone cases and gives a counter example for the general case.
Introduction
An acyclic tournament is a binary relation that defines a linear order; such relations are thought to represent individual preferences between alternatives. It is a basic problem in economics to find functions that map individual preference profiles to collective preferences satisfying two natural conditions: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) and Pareto efficiency (P). IIA requires that the collective preference on two alternatives depends only on the individual preference on these alternatives. Representing the individual preferences on two alternatives as Boolean variables, the collective preference is determined by a Boolean function on these variables. The P condition requires that identical individual preference on two alternatives imply the same for the Partly supported by an ISF Bikura grant. I wish to thank Gil Kalai for helpful discussions. Email address: eyal42@math.huji.ac.il (Eyal Beigman). Arrow's impossibility theorem shows that for all non dictatorial aggregation functions there exists a profile of acyclic tournaments that cannot be aggregated into an acyclic tournament.
Definition 2 A set of tournaments C ⊂ ∆ X is closed to an aggregation f iff f (R 1 , . . . , R m ) ∈ C for R 1 , . . . , R m ∈ C.
Thus Arrow's theorem shows that the set of acyclic tournaments is not closed to any aggregation satisfying the IIA and P conditions. From a combinatorial point of view it is interesting to ask whether a similar result would hold on other sets of tournaments.
Much research has been done on sets of acyclic tournaments (also called restricted domains) that preserve acyclicity under aggregation such as Black's [2] work on single peaked tournaments.
1 It can be shown that the set of single peaked tournaments is closed to aggregation. The problem with the set of single peaked tournaments is the lack of symmetry between alternatives. For instance, alternatives in the middle 2 can never be the least preferred for any tournament in the set so they have an inherent advantage upon those at the beginning or the end.
A set of tournaments is symmetric if it is closed to permutations i.e. R ∈ C implies R π ∈ C for any permutation π. The group of permutations acts transitively on the set of acyclic tournaments, thus the set of acyclic tournaments is symmetric but has no proper symmetric subsets, hence no restricted domain is symmetric. The cyclic tournaments on three alternatives namely {R 1 , R 2 } such that aR 1 b, bR 1 c, cR 1 a and aR 2 c, cR 2 b, 1 A full characterization of acyclicity preserving sets was given by Kalai and Muller [3] . 2 The single peakedness is relative to some fixed linear order, middle in this case refers to alternatives that are neither the most or least preferred relative to the fixed order. bR 2 a are an example of a symmetric set of tournaments. Another example is the set of i-nearly acyclic tournaments 1 ≤ i ≤ n 2 , these are tournaments which disagree with acyclic tournament on no more then i pairs a, b ∈ X.
Are there any symmetric sets of tournaments that are closed under some aggregation? These questions appeared in the wider framework of choice functions. A choice function on a set of alternatives X is a function specifying for each subset of X the most preferred alternative, the only requirement being that it belongs to the subset. This is another way to model preference, through a function that specifies the most preferred alternative from any set. Linear orders are embedded in this class through maximizing functions, but this class is wider 3 . As with tournaments, the notions of symmetry and aggregation can be generalized to choice functions and it is natural to ask whether there exist symmetric sets of choice function that are closed to aggregation. It was conjectured by Kalai [4] that the only symmetric set of choice functions on at least four alternatives closed to non dictatorial aggregation is the set of all choice functions. A variant of this definition is to look at constant size subsets of X (a tournament is a choice function on 2-sets). k-set choice functions were studied by Shelah [6] who proved the conjecture for 7 ≤ k ≤ |X| − 7. In this paper we explore Kalai's conjecture for tournaments, we show that the general conjecture is false but it becomes true with some additional conditions. This results introduces new directions in the study of the Arrow impossibility phenomena in classical social choice theory and shows that the phenomena is further reaching than indicated by previous results. A natural resolution to Arrow's paradox would be to relax the transitivity requirement a little. Had the domain of i-nearly acyclic tournaments been closed to aggregation, it would have been possible to create an almost ideal voting scheme by tolerating a bounded amount of irrationality. The main theorem shows, however, that neither this domain nor any other domain obtained by relaxing the transitivity requirement, is closed to monotone aggregation. Thus, there is no bound on the irrationality generated through aggregation.
In section 5 we show that the impossibility results do not necessarily apply to non monotone aggregation functions. We prove this by constructing a domain of tournaments that is both symmetric and closed to a non monotone aggregation function. This shows that Kalai's conjecture is false in the general case and that monotinicity is an essential part of the impossibility phenomena. It is left to future research to characterize symmetric domains that are closed to non monotone aggregation.
Preliminaries
We identify X with a set of |X| vertices and we identify tournament R with an orientation (X, E) of the full graph K |X| such that < a, b >∈ E iff aRb. Condition I implies that f is characterized by a family of Boolean functions Table 1 The two place aggregation functions 3 The non neutral case Proposition 1 If C is closed to an m-place non neutral aggregation then it is closed to a 2-place non neutral aggregation.
An edge {o, a} is out of o if oRa and it is into
proof: Let f be a non neutral aggregation for which C is closed. Non neutrality is a consequence of
We define a 2-place aggregation as follows: proof: It follows from the proposition that if C is closed to a non neutral aggregation it is closed to an aggregation f such that f <a,b> is a two place Boolean aggregation function. There are four such functions:
is decreasing if there exists a decreasing triple in f .
By this definition f is increasing if there exists a triple (a, o, b) ∈ X 3 such that f <o,a> and f <o,b> are two different dictators, two ORs or a dictator and an OR, and decreasing if they are two different dictators two ANDs or a dictator and an AND. 
Lemma 1 For a non neutral aggregation f there exists
If f is decreasing then for all 0 < k < n − 1 and o ∈ X: 
Proposition 2 If C is a nonempty symmetric set of tournaments on at least four vertices closed to a non neutral 2-place aggregation function f then
proof: It follows from lemma 2 that f is increasing and decreasing. Any tournament has some vertex o ∈ X which is neither a sink nor a source, hence C o k = ∅ for some 0 < k < n − 1. Lemma 3 implies that C o k = ∅ for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1 and in particular this shows C contains tournaments with o as a source and as a sink. Having made these observations we proceed by induction.
The induction base n = 4: In this case ∆ 4 consists of four symmetry orbits with out degrees (0, 1, 2, 3) (linear order), (1, 1, 1, 3 ), (0, 2, 2, 2) and (1, 1, 2, 2) . It follows from the definition of increasing in f that subtracting one from one entry and adding it to another takes us from one tournament in C to another one in C. This shows that if C contains a tournament from any one of the orbits it contains a tournament from all the other orbits. Since C is non empty and symmetric it follows that C = ∆ 4 . Note that the set of cyclic tournaments on three vertices is closed to the aggregation defined by f <o,a> = f <a,b> = f <b,o> = OR hence the proposition is not true for less than four vertices.
Corollary 2 If C is a nonempty symmetric set of tournaments on at least four vertices closed to a non neutral m-place aggregation
f then C = ∆ X .
The neutral monotone case
We identify between Boolean functions and neutral aggregations they define. Let C be a non empty symmetric set of tournaments on more than four vertices closed to a neutral aggregation f . For aggregations on two voters the theorem is trivial since the only possible aggregations are the two dictator functions.
Proposition 3 If C is closed to an m-place non dictatorial neutral aggregation then it is closed to some 3-place non dictatorial neutral aggregation.
proof: Let r be the minimal integer for which there is an r-placed non dictatorial aggregation and let f be such an aggregation. Assume r ≥ 4 and let [r] = {1, . . . , r}. f (x 1 , . . . , x r ) = x j if x 1 , . . . , x r has some repetition of variables. . . . , x r ) = x j is an r − 1 aggregation function, hence the minimality assumption on r implies that f (x 1 , . . . , x r ) is dictatorial, thus f (x 1 , . . . , Table 2 The three place neutral aggregation functions
Claim 1 There exists j ∈ [r] such that

proof: For two indices
Since h is non constant on Q it follows that there is some k such that h(1, k) = 1. W.l.g we may assume h(1, 2) = 3. This implies that f (1 − x, 1 − x, x, x, . . . , x) = x, but on the other hand h(3, 4) = 1 thus
The contradiction proves the claim.
For any a, b ∈ X and R 1 , . . . , R r ∈ C let α 1 , . . . , α r ∈ {0, 1} be a tuple corresponding to aR 1 b, . . . , aR r b. Since r > 2 there must be some repetition thus w.l.g α 1 = α 2 . It follows from the claim that f (x 1 , x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x r ) = x j for variables x 1 , . . . α 1 , α 3 , . . . , α r ) = α j . Since this holds for any tuple it follows that f = D j , thus f is dictatorial contrary to the assumption ✷ It follows that C is closed to non dictatorial neutral aggregation only if it is closed to three voter non dictatorial neutral aggregation. There are five Boolean aggregation functions that define a non dictatorial neutral aggregation: Maj 3 -majority, P rty 3 -parity and AntiD 1 ÷ AntiD 3 -anti dictator (see table 2 ). Monotonicity is preserved under repetition of variables x 1 , . . . , x m thus the proposition is true for non dictatorial neutral and monotone functions. This implies that C is closed to such an aggregation only if it is closed to Maj 3 . 3 and o ∈ X. proof: Any tournament on more than four vertices has out degree 1 < k < n − 2 on at least one vertex. Since C = ∅ it follows from lemma 4 that for some 0 ∈ X C o k = ∅ for all 0 ≤ k ≤ n − 1, in particular this shows that C contains tournaments with o as a source and as a sink. We proceed by induction on the number of vertices.
Lemma 4 Let C be a symmetric set of tournaments closed to Maj
The induction base n = 4: As we have already mentioned ∆ 4 has four symmetry orbits. Each row in figure 1 shows three tournaments in one orbit that are aggregated into a tournament in another orbit yielding the following set of implications: 
The set of cyclic tournaments on three vertices is closed to permutations and to Maj 3 aggregation hence the proposition is not true for less than four vertices. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Corollary 3 If C is a nonempty symmetric set of tournaments on at least
The neutral non monotone case
In this section we explicitly construct a proper symmetric set of tournaments that is closed to parity aggregation. This shows that without monotonicity an Arrow type theorem does not hold.
Lemma 5
For n odd let C be the set of all tournaments R ∈ ∆ n such that V R out (o) is odd for every o ∈ X. Then C is a symmetric set of tournaments that is closed to parity. 
